The java implementation of Apache Dubbo. An RPC and microservice framework.
# Threat Model
This project maintains a living threat model at [`docs/threat-model.md`](docs/threat-model.md).
The threat model describes:
- The implicit contract between Apache Dubbo and its downstream users
- Trust boundaries, adversary model, and assumptions about the deployment environment
- Security properties Dubbo provides (conditional on configuration)
- Security properties Dubbo explicitly does *not* provide
- Downstream responsibilities for integrators
- Known misuse patterns and recurring false positives
- Triage dispositions for classifying vulnerability reports
## For vulnerability reporters
Before reporting, consult the threat model to determine whether the finding:
- Violates a claimed security property (ยง8) โ report to [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
- Falls under an out-of-scope or by-design disclaimer (ยง3, ยง9) โ will be closed citing the threat model
- Matches a known non-finding (ยง11a) โ already documented as a false positive
## For automated security tools
The threat model includes a machine-readable companion structure (ยง15) and a triage disposition table (ยง13) that can be used to automate report classification.
Key triage dispositions:
| Disposition | When to apply |
|-------------|--------------|
| `VALID` | Violates ยง8 property via in-scope adversary |
| `OUT-OF-MODEL: trusted-input` | Requires attacker control of trusted registry/config |
| `OUT-OF-MODEL: adversary-not-in-scope` | Requires excluded attacker capability |
| `BY-DESIGN: property-disclaimed` | Concerns property explicitly disclaimed in ยง9 |
| `KNOWN-NON-FINDING` | Matches documented false positive in ยง11a |