{"owner":"apache","repo":"hive","hasSkills":true,"hasMcp":false,"mcpConfig":null,"found":["AGENTS.md"],"skills":{"AGENTS.md":"<!--\n  Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more\n  contributor license agreements.  See the NOTICE file distributed with\n  this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.\n  The ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0\n  (the \"License\"); you may not use this file except in compliance with\n  the License.  You may obtain a copy of the License at\n\n    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n\n  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n  distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n  WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n  limitations under the License.\n-->\n\n# AGENTS.md\n\n## Security\n\nYou are helping a security researcher find and report vulnerabilities in\nApache Hive. Before drafting any report or reaching any conclusion, complete\nthese steps.\n\n### Step 1 — Read the threat model\nRead **[THREAT_MODEL.md](THREAT_MODEL.md)**: the trust boundaries (the\nHiveServer2 SQL front door, the Metastore, the query/UDF execution layer), the\nadversaries in and out of scope, and what Hive upholds versus what it leaves to\nthe operator.\n\n### Step 2 — Read the security policy\nRead **[SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)** for how to report.\n\n### Key scoping facts (see THREAT_MODEL.md)\n- The **HiveServer2** SQL front door and directly exposed **Hive Metastore**\n  endpoints are the primary untrusted boundaries; execution clusters and\n  internal service dependencies are assumed to run inside an operator-controlled\n  perimeter.\n- **UDFs, SerDes, custom InputFormats, and `TRANSFORM` scripts are\n  code-execution by design**, not a sandbox — running authorized code is a\n  feature, not a vulnerability.\n- Transport security (TLS), the choice of authorization model (Ranger /\n  SQL-standard / storage-based), and network isolation are **operator**\n  responsibilities, not engine invariants.\n- Hive does **not** defend against an operator with `root`, the Hadoop\n  superuser, or direct HDFS / metastore-DB access.\n\n### Step 3 — Route the finding\nRoute the finding to exactly one disposition in **THREAT_MODEL.md §13**\n(VALID, or one of the `OUT-OF-MODEL` / `BY-DESIGN` dispositions) and cite the\nsection that justifies the call. This model is **v0** — open questions for the\nPMC are in §14.\n"},"files":{"AGENTS.md":"<!--\n  Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more\n  contributor license agreements.  See the NOTICE file distributed with\n  this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.\n  The ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0\n  (the \"License\"); you may not use this file except in compliance with\n  the License.  You may obtain a copy of the License at\n\n    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n\n  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n  distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n  WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n  limitations under the License.\n-->\n\n# AGENTS.md\n\n## Security\n\nYou are helping a security researcher find and report vulnerabilities in\nApache Hive. Before drafting any report or reaching any conclusion, complete\nthese steps.\n\n### Step 1 — Read the threat model\nRead **[THREAT_MODEL.md](THREAT_MODEL.md)**: the trust boundaries (the\nHiveServer2 SQL front door, the Metastore, the query/UDF execution layer), the\nadversaries in and out of scope, and what Hive upholds versus what it leaves to\nthe operator.\n\n### Step 2 — Read the security policy\nRead **[SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)** for how to report.\n\n### Key scoping facts (see THREAT_MODEL.md)\n- The **HiveServer2** SQL front door and directly exposed **Hive Metastore**\n  endpoints are the primary untrusted boundaries; execution clusters and\n  internal service dependencies are assumed to run inside an operator-controlled\n  perimeter.\n- **UDFs, SerDes, custom InputFormats, and `TRANSFORM` scripts are\n  code-execution by design**, not a sandbox — running authorized code is a\n  feature, not a vulnerability.\n- Transport security (TLS), the choice of authorization model (Ranger /\n  SQL-standard / storage-based), and network isolation are **operator**\n  responsibilities, not engine invariants.\n- Hive does **not** defend against an operator with `root`, the Hadoop\n  superuser, or direct HDFS / metastore-DB access.\n\n### Step 3 — Route the finding\nRoute the finding to exactly one disposition in **THREAT_MODEL.md §13**\n(VALID, or one of the `OUT-OF-MODEL` / `BY-DESIGN` dispositions) and cite the\nsection that justifies the call. This model is **v0** — open questions for the\nPMC are in §14.\n"},"items":[{"name":"AGENTS.md","path":"AGENTS.md","title":"AGENTS.md","content":"<!--\n  Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more\n  contributor license agreements.  See the NOTICE file distributed with\n  this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.\n  The ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0\n  (the \"License\"); you may not use this file except in compliance with\n  the License.  You may obtain a copy of the License at\n\n    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n\n  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n  distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n  WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n  See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n  limitations under the License.\n-->\n\n# AGENTS.md\n\n## Security\n\nYou are helping a security researcher find and report vulnerabilities in\nApache Hive. Before drafting any report or reaching any conclusion, complete\nthese steps.\n\n### Step 1 — Read the threat model\nRead **[THREAT_MODEL.md](THREAT_MODEL.md)**: the trust boundaries (the\nHiveServer2 SQL front door, the Metastore, the query/UDF execution layer), the\nadversaries in and out of scope, and what Hive upholds versus what it leaves to\nthe operator.\n\n### Step 2 — Read the security policy\nRead **[SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)** for how to report.\n\n### Key scoping facts (see THREAT_MODEL.md)\n- The **HiveServer2** SQL front door and directly exposed **Hive Metastore**\n  endpoints are the primary untrusted boundaries; execution clusters and\n  internal service dependencies are assumed to run inside an operator-controlled\n  perimeter.\n- **UDFs, SerDes, custom InputFormats, and `TRANSFORM` scripts are\n  code-execution by design**, not a sandbox — running authorized code is a\n  feature, not a vulnerability.\n- Transport security (TLS), the choice of authorization model (Ranger /\n  SQL-standard / storage-based), and network isolation are **operator**\n  responsibilities, not engine invariants.\n- Hive does **not** defend against an operator with `root`, the Hadoop\n  superuser, or direct HDFS / metastore-DB access.\n\n### Step 3 — Route the finding\nRoute the finding to exactly one disposition in **THREAT_MODEL.md §13**\n(VALID, or one of the `OUT-OF-MODEL` / `BY-DESIGN` dispositions) and cite the\nsection that justifies the call. This model is **v0** — open questions for the\nPMC are in §14.\n","category":"root","tokens":600}]}